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In-reply-to » @sorenpeter !! I freaking love your Timeline ... I kind of have an justified PHP phobia 😅 but, I'm definitely thinking about giving it a try!

Thank you @aelaraji@aelaraji.com, I’m glad you like it. I use PHP because it’s everywhere on cheap hosting and no need for the user to log into a terminal to setup it up. Timeline is not mean to be use locally. For that I think something like twtxt2html is a better fit. (and happy to see you using simple.css on you new log page;)

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In-reply-to » @prologic Some criticisms and a possible alternative direction:

@falsifian@www.falsifian.org TLS won’t help you if you change your domain name. How will people know if it’s really you? Maybe that’s not the biggest problem for something with such low stakes as twtxt, but it’s a reasonable concern that could be solved using signatures from an unchanging cryptographic key.

This idea is the basis of Nostr. Notes can be posted to many relays and every note is signed with your private key. It doesn’t matter where you get the note from, your client can verify its authenticity. That way, relays don’t need to be trusted.

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In-reply-to » @prologic earlier you suggested extending hashes to 11 characters, but here's an argument that they should be even longer than that.

@prologic@twtxt.net Brute force. I just hashed a bunch of versions of both tweets until I found a collision.

I mostly just wanted an excuse to write the program. I don’t know how I feel about actually using super-long hashes; could make the twts annoying to read if you prefer to view them untransformed.

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@prologic@twtxt.net earlier you suggested extending hashes to 11 characters, but here’s an argument that they should be even longer than that.

Imagine I found this twt one day at https://example.com/twtxt.txt :

2024-09-14T22:00Z Useful backup command: rsync -a “$HOME” /mnt/backup screenshot of the command working

and I responded with “(#5dgoirqemeq) Thanks for the tip!”. Then I’ve endorsed the twt, but it could latter get changed to

2024-09-14T22:00Z Useful backup command: rm -rf /some_important_directory screenshot of the command working

which also has an 11-character base32 hash of 5dgoirqemeq. (I’m using the existing hashing method with https://example.com/twtxt.txt as the feed url, but I’m taking 11 characters instead of 7 from the end of the base32 encoding.)

That’s what I meant by “spoofing” in an earlier twt.

I don’t know if preventing this sort of attack should be a goal, but if it is, the number of bits in the hash should be at least two times log2(number of attempts we want to defend against), where the “two times” is because of the birthday paradox.

Side note: current hashes always end with “a” or “q”, which is a bit wasteful. Maybe we should take the first N characters of the base32 encoding instead of the last N.

Code I used for the above example: https://fossil.falsifian.org/misc/file?name=src/twt_collision/find_collision.c
I only needed to compute 43394987 hashes to find it.

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In-reply-to » Interesting.. QUIC isn't very quick over fast internet.

@prologic@twtxt.net

They’re in Section 6:

  • Receiver should adopt UDP GRO. (Something about saving CPU processing UDP packets; I’m a but fuzzy about it.) And they have suggestions for making GRO more useful for QUIC.

  • Some other receiver-side suggestions: “sending delayed QUICK ACKs”; “using recvmsg to read multiple UDF packets in a single system call”.

  • Use multiple threads when receiving large files.

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In-reply-to » @prologic Some criticisms and a possible alternative direction:

@mckinley@twtxt.net

HTTPS is supposed to do [verification] anyway.

TLS provides verification that nobody is tampering with or snooping on your connection to a server. It doesn’t, for example, verify that a file downloaded from server A is from the same entity as the one from server B.

I was confused by this response for a while, but now I think I understand what you’re getting at. You are pointing out that with signed feeds, I can verify the authenticity of a feed without accessing the original server, whereas with HTTPS I can’t verify a feed unless I download it myself from the origin server. Is that right?

I.e. if the HTTPS origin server is online and I don’t mind taking the time and bandwidth to contact it, then perhaps signed feeds offer no advantage, but if the origin server might not be online, or I want to download a big archive of lots of feeds at once without contacting each server individually, then I need signed feeds.

feed locations [being] URLs gives some flexibility

It does give flexibility, but perhaps we should have made them URIs instead for even more flexibility. Then, you could use a tag URI, urn:uuid:*, or a regular old URL if you wanted to. The spec seems to indicate that the url tag should be a working URL that clients can use to find a copy of the feed, optionally at multiple locations. I’m not very familiar with IP{F,N}S but if it ensures you own an identifier forever and that identifier points to a current copy of your feed, it could be a great way to fix it on an individual basis without breaking any specs :)

I’m also not very familiar with IPFS or IPNS.

I haven’t been following the other twts about signatures carefully. I just hope whatever you smart people come up with will be backwards-compatible so it still works if I’m too lazy to change how I publish my feed :-)

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In-reply-to » @aelaraji how would that work exactly? Does that mean then that every user is required to have a cox side profile? Who maintains cox site? Is it centralized or decentralized can be relied upon?

@prologic@twtxt.net well…

how would that work exactly?

To my limited knowledge, Keyoxide is an open source project offering different tools for verifying one’s online persona(s). That’s done by either A) creating an Ariande Profile using the web interface, a CLI. or B) Just using your GPG key. Either way, you add in Identity claims to your different profiles, links and whatnot, and finally advertise your profile … Then there is a second set of Mobile/Web clients and CLI your correspondents can use to check your identity claims. I think of them like the front-ends of GPG Keyservers (which keyoxide leverages for verification when you opt for the GPG Key method), where you verify profiles using links, Key IDs and Fingerprints…

Who maintains cox site? Is it centralized or decentralized can be relied upon?

  • Maintainers? Definitely not me, but here’s their Git stuff and OpenCollective page
  • Both ASP and Keyoxide Webtools can be self-hosted. I don’t see a central authority here… + As mentioned on their FAQ page the whole process can be done manually, so you don’t have to relay on any one/thing if you don’t want to, the whole thing is just another tool for convenience (with a bit of eye candy).

Does that mean then that every user is required to have a cox side profile?

Nop. But it looks like a nice option to prove that I’m the same person to whom that may concern if I ever change my Twtxt URL, host/join a yarn pod or if I reach out on other platforms to someone I’ve met in her. Otherwise I’m just happy exchanging GPG keys or confirm the change IRL at a coffee shop or something. 😁

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In-reply-to » @bender Yes, they do 🤣 Implicitly, or threading would never work at all 😅 Nor lookups 🤣 They are used as keys. Think of them like a primary key in a database or index. I totally get where you're coming from, but there are trade-offs with using Message/Thread Ids as opposed to Content Addressing (like we do) and I believe we would just encounter other problems by doing so.

@prologic@twtxt.net a signature IS encryption in reverse. If my private key becomes compromised then they can impersonate me. Being able to manage promotion and revocation of keys needed even in a system where its used for just signatures.

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In-reply-to » @falsifian In my opinion it was a mistake that we defined the first url field in the feed to define the URL for hashing. It should have been the last encountered one. Then, assuming append-style feeds, you could override the old URL with a new one from a certain point on:

I was not suggesting to that everyone need to setup a working webfinger endpoint, but that we take the format of nick+(sub)domain as base for generating the hashed together with the message date and content.

If we omit the protocol prefix from the way we do things now will that not solve most of the problems? In the case of gemini://gemini.ctrl-c.club/~nristen/twtxt.txt they also have a working twtxt.txt at https://ctrl-c.club/~nristen/twtxt.txt … damn I just notice the gemini. subdomain.

Okay what about defining a prefers protocol as part of the hash schema? so 1: https , 2: http 3: gemini 4: gopher ?

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In-reply-to » Interesting.. QUIC isn't very quick over fast internet.

@xuu@txt.sour.is Thanks for the link. I found a pdf on one of the authors’ home pages: https://ahmadhassandebugs.github.io/assets/pdf/quic_www24.pdf . I wonder how the protocol was evaluated closer to the time it became a standard, and whether anything has changed. I wonder if network speeds have grown faster than CPU speeds since then. The paper says the performance is around the same below around 600 Mbps.

To be fair, I don’t think QUIC was ever expected to be faster for transferring a single stream of data. I think QUIC is supposed to reduce the impact of a dropped packet by making sure it only affects the stream it’s part of. I imagine QUIC still has that advantage, and this paper is showing the other side of a tradeoff.

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In-reply-to » (#mp6ox4a) @cuaxolotl Ah, thanks for reporting back! Okay, so you’re basically manually “crawling” feeds right now. 🤔 What do you think about the idea of adding something like # follow_notify = gemini://foo/bar to your feed’s metadata, so that clients who follow you can ping that URL every now and then? How would you even notice that, do you regularly read your gemini logs? 🤔

@movq@www.uninformativ.de Damn! I’m two years late to the discussion 😅 So basically, one could just make a bash script/cron job on the side for pinging non-Http feeds from time to time and the receiving end would get it IF they check their logs.

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In-reply-to » (#mp6ox4a) @cuaxolotl Ah, thanks for reporting back! Okay, so you’re basically manually “crawling” feeds right now. 🤔 What do you think about the idea of adding something like # follow_notify = gemini://foo/bar to your feed’s metadata, so that clients who follow you can ping that URL every now and then? How would you even notice that, do you regularly read your gemini logs? 🤔

@prologic@twtxt.net Unfortunately it only work if I pull the feed in debug mode jenny -D otherwise, it misses things up if I add that snippet of text to links in my .config/jenny/follow file 😅 Anyway, it was a nice try.

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In-reply-to » (#mp6ox4a) @cuaxolotl Ah, thanks for reporting back! Okay, so you’re basically manually “crawling” feeds right now. 🤔 What do you think about the idea of adding something like # follow_notify = gemini://foo/bar to your feed’s metadata, so that clients who follow you can ping that URL every now and then? How would you even notice that, do you regularly read your gemini logs? 🤔

@movq@www.uninformativ.de @prologic@twtxt.net Hey! I may have found a silly trick to announce my following to people hosting their feeds on the Gemini space using the requested URI itself instead of relaying on the USER Agent 😂. I’ve copied my current feed over to my (to be) Gemlog for testing. And if I do a jenny -D "gemini://gem.aelaraji.com/twtxt.txt?follower=aelaraji@https://aelaraji.com/twtxt.txt" and this happens:

A) As a follower, I get the feed as usual.
B) As the feed owner, I get this in logs:

hostname:1965 - “gemini://gem.aelaraji.com/twtxt.txt?follower=aelaraji@https://aelaraji.com/twtxt.txt” 20 “text/plain;lang=en-US”

You could do the same for Gopher feeds but only if you want to announce yourself by throwing in an error in their logs, then you’ll need a second request to fetch the feed. jenny -D "gopher://gopher.aelaraji.com/twtxt.txt&follower=aelaraji@https:/aelaraji.com/twtxt.txt" gave me this :

gopher.aelaraji.com:70 - [09/Sep/2024:22:08:54 +0000] “GET 0/twtxt.txt&follower=aelaraji@https:/aelaraji.com/twtxt.txt HTTP/1.0” 404 0 “” “Unknown gopher client”

NB: the follower=... string won’t appear in gopher logs after a ? but if I replace it with a + or a & and it works. There will be a missing / after the https:. Probably a client thing.

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In-reply-to » On the Subject of Feed Identities; I propose the following:

@mckinley@twtxt.net To answer some of your questions:

Are SSH signatures standardized and are there robust software libraries that can handle them? We’ll need a library in at least Python and Go to provide verified feed support with the currently used clients.

We already have this. Ed25519 libraries exist for all major languages. Aside from using ssh-keygen -Y sign and ssh-keygen -Y verify, you can also use the salty CLI itself (https://git.mills.io/prologic/salty), and I’m sure there are other command-line tools that could be used too.

If we all implemented this, every twt hash would suddenly change and every conversation thread we’ve ever had would at least lose its opening post.

Yes. This would happen, so we’d have to make a decision around this, either a) a cut-off point or b) some way to progressively transition.

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In-reply-to » @falsifian In my opinion it was a mistake that we defined the first url field in the feed to define the URL for hashing. It should have been the last encountered one. Then, assuming append-style feeds, you could override the old URL with a new one from a certain point on:

how little data is needed for generating the hashes? Instead of the full URL, can we makedo with just the domain (example.net) so we avoid the conflicts with gemini://, https:// and only http:// (like in my own twtxt.txt) or construct something like like a webfinger id nick@domain (also used by mastodon etc.) from the domain and nick if there, else use domain as nick as well

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In-reply-to » @prologic Some criticisms and a possible alternative direction:

@lyse@lyse.isobeef.org This looks like a nice way to do it.

Another thought: if clients can’t agree on the url (for example, if we switch to this new way, but some old clients still do it the old way), that could be mitigated by computing many hashes for each twt: one for every url in the feed. So, if a feed has three URLs, every twt is associated with three hashes when it comes time to put threads together.

A client stills need to choose one url to use for the hash when composing a reply, but this might add some breathing room if there’s a period when clients are doing different things.

(From what I understand of jenny, this would be difficult to implement there since each pseudo-email can only have one msgid to match to the in-reply-to headers. I don’t know about other clients.)

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In-reply-to » @prologic Some criticisms and a possible alternative direction:

@falsifian@www.falsifian.org In my opinion it was a mistake that we defined the first url field in the feed to define the URL for hashing. It should have been the last encountered one. Then, assuming append-style feeds, you could override the old URL with a new one from a certain point on:

# url = https://example.com/alias/txtxt.txt
# url = https://example.com/initial/twtxt.txt
<message 1 uses the initial URL>
<message 2 uses the initial URL, too>
# url = https://example.com/new/twtxt.txt
<message 3 uses the new URL>
# url = https://example.com/brand-new/twtxt.txt
<message 4 uses the brand new URL>

In theory, the same could be done for prepend-style feeds. They do exist, I’ve come around them. The parser would just have to calculate the hashes afterwards and not immediately.

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In-reply-to » All this hash breakage made me wonder if we should try to introduce “message IDs” after all. 😅

@movq@www.uninformativ.de Another idea: just hash the feed url and time, without the message content. And don’t twt more than once per second.

Maybe you could even just use the time, and rely on @-mentions to disambiguate. Not sure how that would work out.

Though I kind of like the idea of twts being immutable. At least, it’s clear which version of a twt you’re replying to (assuming nobody is engineering hash collisions).

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In-reply-to » On the Subject of Feed Identities; I propose the following:

@prologic@twtxt.net Some criticisms and a possible alternative direction:

  1. Key rotation. I’m not a security person, but my understanding is that it’s good to be able to give keys an expiry date and replace them with new ones periodically.

  2. It makes maintaining a feed more complicated. Now instead of just needing to put a file on a web server (and scan the logs for user agents) I also need to do this. What brought me to twtxt was its radical simplicity.

Instead, maybe we should think about a way to allow old urls to be rotated out? Like, my metadata could somehow say that X used to be my primary URL, but going forward from date D onward my primary url is Y. (Or, if you really want to use public key cryptography, maybe something similar could be used for key rotation there.)

It’s nice that your scheme would add a way to verify the twts you download, but https is supposed to do that anyway. If you don’t trust https to do that (maybe you don’t like relying on root CAs?) then maybe your preferred solution should be reflected by your primary feed url. E.g. if you prefer the security offered by IPFS, then maybe an IPNS url would do the trick. The fact that feed locations are URLs gives some flexibility. (But then rotation is still an issue, if I understand ipns right.)

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On the Subject of Feed Identities; I propose the following:

  1. Generate a Private/Public ED25519 key pair
  2. Use this key pair to sign your Twtxt feed
  3. Use it as your feed’s identity in place of # url = as # key = ...

For example:

$ ssh-keygen -f prologic@twtxt.net
$ ssh-keygen -Y sign -n prologic@twtxt.net -f prologic@twtxt.net twtxt.txt

And your feed would looke like:

# nick        = prologic
# key         = SHA256:23OiSfuPC4zT0lVh1Y+XKh+KjP59brhZfxFHIYZkbZs
# sig         = twtxt.txt.sig
# prev        = j6bmlgq twtxt.txt/1
# avatar      = https://twtxt.net/user/prologic/avatar#gdoicerjkh3nynyxnxawwwkearr4qllkoevtwb3req4hojx5z43q
# description = "Problems are Solved by Method" 🇦🇺👨‍💻👨‍🦯🏹♔ 🏓⚯ 👨‍👩‍👧‍👧🛥 -- James Mills (operator of twtxt.net / creator of Yarn.social 🧶)

2024-06-14T18:22:17Z	(#nef6byq) @<bender https://twtxt.net/user/bender/twtxt.txt>  Hehe thanks! 😅 Still gotta sort out some other bugs, but that's tomorrows job 🤞
...

Twt Hash extension would change of course to use a feed’s ED25519 public key fingerprint.

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In-reply-to » @bender Sorry, trust was the wrong word. Trust as in, you do not have to check with anything or anyone that the hash is valid. You can verify the hash is valid by recomputing the hash from the content of what it points to, etc.

@bender@twtxt.net Yes, they do 🤣 Implicitly, or threading would never work at all 😅 Nor lookups 🤣 They are used as keys. Think of them like a primary key in a database or index. I totally get where you’re coming from, but there are trade-offs with using Message/Thread Ids as opposed to Content Addressing (like we do) and I believe we would just encounter other problems by doing so.

My money is on extending the Twt Subject extension to support more (optional) advanced “subjects”; i.e: indicating you edited a Twt you already published in your feed as @falsifian@www.falsifian.org indicated 👌

Then we have a secondary (bure much rarer) problem of the “identity” of a feed in the first place. Using the URL you fetch the feed from as @lyse@lyse.isobeef.org ’s client tt seems to do or using the # url = metadata field as every other client does (according to the spec) is problematic when you decide to change where you host your feed. In fact the spec says:

Users are advised to not change the first one of their urls. If they move their feed to a new URL, they should add this new URL as a new url field.

See Choosing the Feed URL – This is one of our longest debates and challenges, and I think (_I suspect along with @xuu@txt.sour.is _) that the right way to solve this is to use public/private key(s) where you actually have a public key fingerprint as your feed’s unique identity that never changes.

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In-reply-to » @movq @prologic Another option would be: when you edit a twt, prefix the new one with (#[old hash]) and some indication that it's an edited version of the original tweet with that hash. E.g. if the hash used to be abcd123, the new version should start "(#abcd123) (redit)".

@bender@twtxt.net Sorry, trust was the wrong word. Trust as in, you do not have to check with anything or anyone that the hash is valid. You can verify the hash is valid by recomputing the hash from the content of what it points to, etc.

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In-reply-to » All this hash breakage made me wonder if we should try to introduce “message IDs” after all. 😅

@movq@www.uninformativ.de @prologic@twtxt.net Another option would be: when you edit a twt, prefix the new one with (#[old hash]) and some indication that it’s an edited version of the original tweet with that hash. E.g. if the hash used to be abcd123, the new version should start “(#abcd123) (redit)”.

What I like about this is that clients that don’t know this convention will still stick it in the same thread. And I feel it’s in the spirit of the old pre-hash (subject) convention, though that’s before my time.

I guess it may not work when the edited twt itself is a reply, and there are replies to it. Maybe that could be solved by letting twts have more than one (subject) prefix.

But the great thing about the current system is that nobody can spoof message IDs.

I don’t think twtxt hashes are long enough to prevent spoofing.

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